By: Sanchaly Bhattacharya
The author is a second-year master’s student at Jindal School of International Affairs. She can be reached at 23jsia-sanchaly@jgu.edu.in
Image Source: Snapshot of the Newsletter
Introduction
This year, the Northeast Asian region has been witnessing multiple elections. Earlier, in January, the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan had both the legislative Yuan and presidential election, followed by the election in Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan. Due to the proximity of the Indo-Pacific region and China’s presence, the region has become one of the most focused regions in the world. The region is characterized by historical conflicts such as the Korean War and territorial disputes involving China, Taiwan, and Japan. Furthermore, China’s (People’s Republic of China) claim over Taiwan and North Korea as a ‘rogue state’ threatening South Korea makes this region more peculiar than the other regions. Geopolitics is always a major focus of countries’ domestic electoral politics in this region. Moreover, the US’s commitment to resist any attack on Taiwan and its military presence in Japan and South Korea increases the geopolitical calculations to ensure the continuation of the strategic interests of different countries.
Strategic ambiguity is one of the approaches that countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan maintain to shape geopolitical behaviour. As conceptualized by Eisenberg, ambiguity is the thoughtful strategy when the parties keep their words ambiguous purposefully to accomplish their respective objectivesi. That means the concept of ambiguity is relational, where the parties would keep the context of the particular matter open to interpretation. In the context of Northeast Asia, SA refers to the deliberate policy employed by the countries about their intentions and policies, especially in terms of security and inter-state relations. This approach has become prominent in electoral politics, particularly against the backdrop of China’s assertiveness and North Korea’s unpredictable behaviour, shaping the ambiguous but shifting calculations of the neighbouring countries in the region. This piece will discuss the historical background from where the concept of SA emerged and will delve deeper into case studies of different countries.
Historical Context of Strategic Ambiguity in Northeast Asia
The civil war between the communist party and the nationalist party (KMT) compelled the KMT under then-President Chiang-Kai Shek of ROC to relocate to Taiwan in 1949. While initially countries supported Taiwan, based on UN Resolution 2758, in 1978, the US recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC), under the CCP (Communist Party of China) as the sole legitimate representative of China ii. Considering the Cold War period and the US’s Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the cross-strait relations largely rely on ‘Strategic ambiguity’. The SA in the context of cross-strait relations has two-fold dimensions: one is from the US side, which is decades its positioning on both sides, to prevent Beijing from launching an attack against Taiwan and also being equivocal against Taiwan’s de-jure independence from the mainland. The other SA reflects on both the PRC and ROC’s 1992 consensus, where both sides have accepted it with different interpretations iii. Both sides of the straits acknowledged that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belonged to one large ‘China family’ but continued the disputes over the representative of China in the international community.
The division of the Korean peninsula into two different countries, during the Cold War period after the end of the Korean War was the origin time of SA. Eventually, the gap across the Korean peninsula has become a dominant factor due to the differentiation between the governance styles, where North Korea under Communist, i.e., authoritative administration, and South Korea under democratic governance. The US’s commitment to protect South Korea’s democracy had become a foundation to resist any revisionist tendencies by North Korea. Against the backdrop of China’s rising power and Russia’s invasion, South Korea started to tilt towards a more balanced relationship with China. Hence, the SA approach is more to maintain the strategic autonomy of the country by having balanced relations with both the US and China to keep a check on North Korea.
The SA concept emerged in the context of Japan in making the post-war constitution, particularly Article 9, reassures the renouncing of war as a method. Japan, under the pacifist constitution, could only maintain its defence forces (SDF). The US has actively helped to rebuild Japan’s economy and also extended the security cooperation, ensuring that Japan could be protected from any possible regional threat iv. However, with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and passive activism in protecting Ukraine, Japan’s dilemma resumes between its national security concerns and pacifist constitution. Maintaining the SA helps Japan to balance between its security concerns and fear of militarization, violating the constitution.
Case studies of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan
Taiwan
This year the election in Taiwan has shown the polarization of politics in line with the relations with mainland China. There is an ongoing debate after Russia invaded Ukraine whether the US will intervene militarily to defend Taiwan if there is ever any attack from mainland China. In this context, the key campaigning of Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was entirely different. The KMT has campaigned that the island should focus on fruitful economic integration with mainland China along with maintaining the status quo, which can be called a bind engagement strategy. On the contrary, the DPP has largely been perceived as a pro-independence party, that advocates continuing with former President Tsai Ing-Wen’s policies of diversifying the economic dependence of Taiwan, but with a harsher tone towards the ‘One China principle’v. The first speech of Lai Ching-te, the newly elected President of Taiwan, has again erupted a series of threatening attacks from mainland China to prevent Taiwan’s so-called separatist movement. The election result of the legislative yuan represents KMT and DPP on equal shoulders, reflecting the people’s willingness to maintain the strategic ambiguity with mainland China. The SA, in a cross-strait context, aims to maintain the balance of threats from the bigger powers like the PRC.
South Korea
South Korea has been following the SA as one of its continuous strategies to balance deterrence and engagement with North Korea. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the passive role of the US and China’s support has encouraged North Korea to increase its threatening posturing over the Korean peninsula. There is a sharp polarization between the voters who favour reconciliation and who prioritize deterrence against North Korea vi. While both the PPP and LDP favour the continuation of US-South Korea’s Security Cooperation, the LDP, the winning political party, would continue its Hawkish stance on North Korean issues. That means the newly formed government will prefer deterrence over engagement while prioritizing security ties with the US.
Japan
The strategic ambiguity is clearly about Japan’s potential offensive measures and maintaining defensive gestures in the region. Japan, under the Shinzo Abe administration, has already signalled that the pacifist nature of Japan’s constitution should be amended. However, there is a larger share of voters and elites who support that this pacifism helps Japan to rebuild the economy and to become from loan recipient to loan giver. Considering the possibility that China’s attack on Taiwan would hinder Japan’s national security directly, the political parties have been maintaining SA regarding revising Article 9 and Self-Defense Forcevii. There is a growing trend of multi-party convergence in maintaining the hedging strategies against North Korea and China and adopting the SA involving Article 9 to ensure Japan’s role in protecting peace and prosperity in the region.
Way forward
While the SA plays a crucial role in Northeast Asian elections, the unavoidable fact is the shifting focus on domestic issues like the ageing population, inflation of necessities, rising prices of real estate, and so on. This year, even after having concerns about cross-strait eruptions, the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), whose manifesto involves domestic issues, has got an impressive number of seats in the legislative yuan. The shifting trend of public sentiment against China and North Korea also reflects the reaction in the ballot when the people in the region would prefer for the candidate who is wiser to handle the ‘balance of threat’ over the provocation measures. The region has not only been the victim of land boundary disputes but there are maritime and air boundary disputes like the Northern Limit Line between North Korea and South Korea and the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) between mainland China and Taiwan. The region is not only known for its historical conflicts during the Cold War period, but now the region is again increasingly becoming one of the key potential zones that might lead to a full-fledged war. Hence, geopolitical stance and maintaining an ambiguous stance are two of the major components in the electoral politics of these countries.
Endnotes
[i] Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication monographs, 51(3), 227-242. kekaburan_dalam_strategi_komunikasi-libre.pdf (d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net)
[ii] UN. (1971, October 25). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly. United Nations Digital Library System. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/654350#:~:text=Restoration%20of%20the%20lawful%20rights%20of
[iii] Wei, C. H. (2016). China–Taiwan relations and the 1992 consensus, 2000− 2008. International Relations of the Asia-pacific, 16(1), 67-95. untitled (silverchair.com)
[iv]U.S. Department of State. (2021, January 14). U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan - United States Department of State. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with japan/#:~:text=Decades%20of%20U.S.%20security%20cooperation%20served
[v]Chien , H. W., Ching , F. L., & Yun , S. L. (2023, August 16). China’s Word Game: A New Narrative of the “One China Principle.” Thediplomat.com. China’s Word Game: A New Narrative of the “One China Principle” – The Diplomat
[vi]Terry, S. M. (2024, April 11). South Korea’s Opposition Parties’ Win: What It Means. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/south-koreas-opposition-parties-win-what-it-means
[vii]Sargana, T. H., & Sargana, M. H. (2023). Japanese Legal Discourse on Article 9: An Analysis of Japan Self Defense Force and Politics of Nuclear Umbrella. Pakistan JL Analysis & Wisdom, 2, 398. Law Journal Library - HeinOnline.org
The views expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not reflect the views or opinions of Diplomania or its members.
Link to our Elections Newsletter:
Comments