European Elections: The Emergence of the Far Right

By: Srikrishnadeva and Vansh Pincha

The authors are second-year master's and bachelor's students, respectively, at the Jindal School of International Affairs. They can be reached at 23jsia-srikrishnadeva@jgu.edu.in and 23jsia-vansh@jgu.edu.in.

Image: Snapshot of Diplomania's Elections Newsletter

Situation Overview

Between the 6th and the 9th of June, 2024 nearly two million Europeans went to the polls in 27 countries to elect the 720 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) for the next 5 years. The number of MEPs to be elected from each EU country, based on the degressive proportionality.  During the elections, the right-wing groups witnessed well-expected gains in the number of seats which was mostly driven by electoral dynamics in just a couple of countries in Europe, notably France and Germany. The elections were marked by setbacks to some popular leaders while right-leaning factions gained ground. For instance, in France, a coalition including President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance, Besoin d'Europe got only 14.60% of the vote. Whereas, in Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic Party was pushed to third rank with only 13.90% of votes, with far-right parties securing the top positions. Meanwhile, in Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, a right-wing populist party, dominated the election with a total vote share of 28.7%. Interestingly, the green and far-left parties outperformed in some of the European countries including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. However, no single bloc emerged with an overall majority in the European Parliament.

Members within the European Union parliament consist of 7 groups which are not based on country-representation but political affiliations. The recent elections established a considerable standing for the following groups: 1) The European Peoples’ Party (EPP); 2) The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; 3) Renew Europe; 4) Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA); 5)European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); 6) Identity and Democracy (ID); 7) The Left Group.

As far as the far-right representation is concerned here, the ECR and ID occupy a significant influence over the EU representation. The ECR, composed of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, the Polish Law and Justice Party, Vox (Sweden), Alliance (Germany) and the Finns Party (Finland), have managed to secure close to 83 seats in the European Parliament and are considered as the 3rd largest group. Additionally, the ID, composed of National Rally (France), Lega of Italy, Freedom Party (Austria), Vlaams Belang (Sweden), Conservatives Peoples’ Party (Estonia), Danish Peoples’ Party (Denmark), Freedom and Direct Democracy (Czech Republic) and the Party for Freedom (Netherlands) are considered the 5th largest group in the European Parliament[1].

Furthermore, the table below shows the consequent rise of far-right nationalism within the major countries in Europe[2]

With this, it is imperative to analyze the factors/sources responsible for the consequential rise of the right-wing in the region. The preceding factors are manifold which may not be specifically targeted towards an issue but essentially amalgamates a plethora of compounding issues carried forth since the financial crisis of 2008. The 2015 Refugee crisis for example, saw a significant influence of refugees and migrants from Turkey to Greek islands like Lesvos, where more than 911,000 refugees and migrants reached European shores amongst which 75% of the same had fled from the conflict-torn areas of Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq[3]. Furthermore, the recent crisis accounted for by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war had seen the far-right criticizing the policies of the ruling governments over the mismanagement of the same, thereby bringing them to prominence.

Climate change also shapes a major precedent in the political narrative. The Freedom Party of Austria’s slogan addressed the need to “Stop the European Chaos, the Asylum Crisis, Climate Terror, Warmongering and COVID-Chaos” in its manifesto in anticipation of the EU elections. Furthermore, the EU Green Deal was criticized by many influential right-wing dogmats as a “punitive transition” which doesn’t quite address the root cause of climate change.[4] 

Analysis and Themes

The recent surge in the far-right has placed a closure among doubts raised that Europe is indeed slowly but steadily headed towards the far right. The same has been characterized by a resurgence in extremist ideas encompassing authoritarian thought, nationalism, protectionism and exclusionist politics. In countries where the moderate or left parties hold power, the far-right occupies a significant chunk of the opposition, characterized by important cultural, national and inter-European fears over several factors discussed above. Consequently, the major issues encompassing Europe could not be ignored even by the moderate factions, lest they harm their standing in the elections because of the general public sentiments and have therefore gotten to either adopt such far-right stances or modify their agendas or manifestos on such issues. The same has led to an increased positive perception of the far-right.

If the manifestos of the ECR and the ID are analysed based on their national and local-level precedents, 4 key issues are brought up which connect other far-right parties. They include:

●       Migration

●       Climate change

●       Islamophobia

●       Xenophobia

            These issues are incorporated as major goals amongst the agendas of the far-right parties and are present in almost every manifesto regardless of how varied their approach is to the same. As such, an analysis over the influence of the far-right over these issues will be studied along with the influence over persisting locally-tailored issues to determine the influence of the far-right and their hold in the national and local-level elections.

Western Europe

The rise of far-right parties across Europe has marked a significant shift in the political landscape, challenging traditional power structures and prompting a reevaluation of national priorities. This surge is often attributed to a confluence of factors, including mass migration, energy crises, wars and widespread calls for political change. As societies grapple with the ramifications of these issues, the far-right has capitalized on public discontent, positioning themselves as viable alternatives to established political parties. This transformation is evident in the differing responses to conflicts such as the Ukraine-Russia crisis, where divisions among rightist parties become apparent. For instance, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has expressed staunch support for Ukraine, advocating for financial, political, and military assistance, while others, such as the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) in France, have argued for a more conciliatory approach, suggesting that a peace resolution is necessary.[5][6] Populists in other countries – Robert Fico in Slovakia, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Viktor Orbán in Hungary are sceptical of sanctions on Russia.[7] These divergent positions illustrate that the far-right is not a monolithic entity; rather, it encompasses a range of ideologies and strategies that reflect varying national interests and historical contexts.

The recent increase in stabbing instances, particularly in the western European nations has efficiently contributed to the rise in Islamophobia. The troubling events were triggered by a stabbing incident on 29th July at a dance school in Southport where three children lost their lives. Despite the authorities confirming that the suspect was not Muslim, misinformation rapidly spread online suggesting that the attacker was an “Islamist immigrant.”[8] Similarly, in Solingen, Germany on the evening of 23rd August a mass stabbing took place during a festival celebrating the 650th anniversary of the city. Similar occurrences occurred in Toledo, Spain on 18th August when the disinformation narrative claimed the perpetrator of the stabbing of a child as a “foreign.”[9] The far-right parties were quick to use these tragedies to criticize the government ahead of some key elections, holding present immigration policies accountable and therefore, shifted the blame on Muslim migrants.[10]

The impact of the 2015 Syrian migration crisis also provides a lens through which to examine the fragmentation within the far-right movement. Parties like Spain's Vox have emerged with a focus that is less about immigration and more influenced by regional dynamics, particularly the rise of Catalan separatism. This indicates that the far-right's appeal is not solely grounded in anti-immigrant sentiment but can also be shaped by specific national narratives and grievances. Moreover, the potential for collaboration between traditional centre-right parties and populist right groups—including far-right factions—has become increasingly plausible. In countries like Italy, France, and Germany, significant portions of the electorate are gravitating towards these coalitions, particularly as economic and social issues take centre stage. However, this coalition-building is fraught with challenges, especially as seen in Germany with the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The AfD’s hardline stance on immigration and energy policies—such as the ruling government’s policy to contentious shift from gas and oil boilers to heat pumps—has created a barrier for traditional parties that perceive it as too radical. Hence, it created popular dissatisfaction because of the expenses, by considering it as too much too hard.[11] 

This illustrates the complex dynamics at play, where rightist factions may seek unity while simultaneously navigating their ideological divides.

The anti-elite narrative espoused by many far-right parties resonates strongly with voters who feel disillusioned by the current government. In France, the RN has effectively positioned itself as an ally of the working class, tapping into grievances voiced at agricultural events like the Salon d’Agriculture. Farmers, facing economic pressures exacerbated by globalization and stringent environmental regulations, have found a voice in the RN’s call for less bureaucratic intervention from the European Union. The party argues that EU policies are overly punitive, stifling agricultural innovation and growth. By championing rural development and opposing what they label “punitive ecology,” the RN crafts a message that aligns with nationalist sentiments and anti-globalization attitudes, fostering a rightward evolution in political discourse across Europe.[12]

The emergence of right-wing populist parties like Austria’s Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), which recently garnered significant electoral success, underscores a broader trend where established governing parties are challenged by new political forces.[13] As the FPÖ takes the lead in national polling, the response from the European Commission, particularly from President Ursula von der Leyen, signals a recognition of the threat posed by these emerging extremes. Her declaration of intent to build a “bastion against the extremes from the left and from the right” reflects the urgency with which mainstream political institutions are reacting to this shifting tide. This highlights the complexities of addressing transnational issues within a nationalist framework, as far-right parties seek to leverage national grievances while simultaneously engaging in broader European narratives.[14]

The interplay of national priorities and transnational issues is emblematic of the contemporary European political landscape. While far-right parties articulate concerns that resonate with local constituencies, their strategies often converge on a critique of overarching EU structures, which they portray as bureaucratic and imperialistic. This critique is particularly potent among voters who feel that their voices are marginalized by technocratic governance and stringent regulations. As these parties gain traction, the potential for significant influence over legislative processes increases, particularly if they manage to forge coalitions with traditional right-leaning parties. The rising discontent over issues such as immigration, energy policy, and perceived elite overreach is driving a more pronounced rightward shift, ultimately reshaping the contours of political power across Europe.

Eastern Europe

The principles incorporated amongst the right-wing parties in Eastern Europe closely resemble their Western counterparts so far as issues dealing with migration, views against minorities and Islamophobic sentiment are concerned. The Eurasian and Eastern European region has seen major prominence and sophistication, especially among countries which have seen democratic and liberalising reforms. While their electoral power isn’t cumulatively significant if the entire region is taken into account, they hold considerable influence in their respective nations and determine their ideological framework based on local precedents prevailing in the region. The vicious cycle created as a result of projecting their political interests stems from local long-standing issues of ethnic-nationalistic discourses, military conflicts and linkages with the far-right groups in Russia. These issues furthermore go beyond the narrow concepts such as democratic backsliding and illiberal turn of events. The far right in Eastern Europe do not pose as a homogenous block but ranges from anti-democratic and authoritarian to ethnocentrism and revisionist governments.

They could be considerably distinguished by the actor type, including non-party manifestations such as movements as well as sub-cultural and historical milieus.[15] Hence, the membership of these groups into concrete political parties may significantly overlap, therefore going to support many right-wing parties in the region. The major point of discourse for the far-right in the region would be the legacy nostalgia for the old despotic regime characterised by an extreme form of national identity. These narratives pose considerable barriers to the process of democracy and the integration of these countries into the European Union. For example, Romania’s Greater Romania Party’s  (PRM) principle aim would be to promote interwar borders as a way of demanding its claims to Moldova. [16]

[17]

In conclusion to the EU Parliamentary election as well as the local general elections within some major countries in the region, worrying trends ensue as these movements have been gaining a considerable foothold therefore giving prominence to several issues generally expressed amongst the manifestos of the common right and far-right discourse. In this context, three countries will be analysed based on the extent to which the far-right has taken a significant hold within the region. They include: 1) Serbia; 2) Greece.

Serbia

Serbia’s last general elections were conducted on the 17th of December 2023, post a snap election announced by the President in November, 2023. Consequently, the helm of governance is occupied by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which is a right-wing populist party, managing to secure 44.27% of the votes and bagging 120/250 seats in the lower house. As far as the performance of the right wing is concerned:

1. The National Democratic Alternative bagged 15/250 seats, securing 5.54% of the votes.

2. The Dveri-POKS (far-right) secured 10/250 seats with 3.92% of the votes.

3. The Serbian Oathkeepers (ultranationalist) secured 10/250 seats with 3.82% of the votes.

   
   

The results of the general elections have seen a rise to prominence of the Serbian far-right with the presence of neo-Nazi and Christian-right variants reported to have been promoting anti-semitic and Islamophobic sentiments. This ongoing trend was in fact noticed since 2000 when no pro-European opposition entered the parliament. The effect was manifold during the polls of June 21st, 2020 which caused the parliamentary pendulum to swing to the right. As far as the 2020 election is concerned, together, the right-leaning parties had managed to secure more than 77% of the popular votes, with 9 or 10 parties being more right-wing than the right-centre. [18]

The effect of the 2015 migration crisis contributed significantly in stirring up the ghosts of national pride. As per trends noticed, the current net-migration rate as of 2024 in Serbia is -167/1000 population, which highlights a 0.6% increase from 2023.[19] Syrians occupy a major chunk, incorporating 37% of the migrant population. Despite the reduction of the influx of migrants (a 44% decrease as of January 2024 from December 2023), the narrative has been kept afresh by the demands of the far-right as well as attitudes of social distance towards the segment despite their close contact.[20] The far-right has made use of social networks to spread such narratives despite them being sporadically condemned by the public. These networks provide the most fertile ground to dissipate populist policies and serve as razor’s edges between legitimate facts and conspiracy theories.

Furthermore, the rise of populist narratives has provided a stable base for the right wing to negate Serbia’s accession to the European Union. As per surveys conducted, late 2009 was characterized by 73% of the population supporting the accession to the European Union and the same had waned to slightly above 50% in 2020.[21] This is furthermore coupled with pro-Russia sentiments with as many as 87% of the Serbians seeing Russia in a favourable light, amongst which 51% have adopted a “highly favourable opinion” towards the same. The rising populism has also stalled the EU accession talks, as is noticed with the differences in the approaches between Serbia and the European Union in approaching the Kosovo conflict. The far-right has therefore used these inherent issues as a scapegoat to strengthen its forms of ideologically motivated extremist behavior.[22]

These issues additionally, have provided an opportunity for the far right to engage in open revanchism through talks of achieving a “Greater Serbia”. This sentiment is also inherent as a core aspect within Serbian political culture, which incorporates the collective feelings of trauma or victimisation wrought in conclusion to the Balkanisation of the region post the breakup of Yugoslavia during 1990 and the outside world’s “Satanization of Serbia” where the population believes that Serbia has been relatively isolated from the other powers present in the region and in the west.[23] This has in turn given rise to collective ethnic sentiments of a lost greater national pride, increasing xenophobia, especially amongst the Albanian-Serbs which have only been reinforced by the media and the far-right narratives since. There is also an inherent fixation on the Kosovo issue especially after Kosovo had recently closed the borders at Brnjak and Merdare (Northern Kosovo which consists of a majority of the Serbian ethnic population).

Greece

The influence of the right-wing in Greece has also been gaining significant traction, especially within the Greek parliament and the conclusion to the general elections that had taken place on the 25th of June 2023. In addition to the mainstream New Democracy Party (centre-right), far-right groups such as The Spartans and Niki have considerable influence along with two other right-wing populist outfits, so much so that they have a say in determining and passing the 3% threshold needed to enter the European Parliament. The counter-narratives against the far-right agenda would seem sparse, with only a small circle of activists initiating counter-discourse. With the dissolution of Greece’s erstwhile radical-right Golden Dawn (a neo-Nazi political organisation, banned in 2020), many thought that the far right was broken, but as Angelique Kouronis had claimed, it was merely reconstructed. In the recent elections, the Spartans, heavily influenced by the Golden Dawn managed to secure 12 seats, winning 4.64% of the vote with the Hellenic Solution and Niki (Victory) securing 4.44% and 3.69% of the seats respectively. This makes the total representation of the far right amounting to 32/300 seats. The Greek Solution, an ultranationalist far-right political party has also been gaining traction since its establishment in 2016 and has been ranked 4th in major parties, solidifying its increasing relevance by managing to secure 12 seats in the Hellenic parliament and 2 seats in the European parliament. 

The rise of the right-wing in Greece could be accounted for by a plethora of factors including:

1. The Economic Crisis and the resultant austerity measures (2008-15)

2. Migration Crisis 2015.

3. Euroscepticism

   
   

As far as immigration is concerned, the Greek Solution has been able to considerably mobilise the votes on the same. As per a survey conducted by ARTE, 90% of Greeks believe that their country has too many migrants.[24] This sentiment also comes in addition to the Greek government’s controversial handling of the influx of migrants. The government had been engaged in non-stop pushbacks of immigrants at the border crossing points which goes in direct violation of the EU’s asylum system and has stayed silent despite the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLF) reports citing the government’s gross mismanagement.[25]

Furthermore, the Eurozone Crisis has become a prominent scapegoat for the rise of populism across Europe, especially within Greece where the prominence of materialist cleavages had considerably been reinforced by the crisis, giving significant rise to right-wing populism. As a result, the hold of Pasok’s Centre-Right New Democracy (ND) party had seen consequent losses for its mismanagement and harsh austerity measures. Parties like the Golden Dawn had made gains from the same, characterising its leaders as the embodiment of the Greeks and their collective will, placing an emphasis on statism and nation and employing the concepts of decadence and national rebirth in its promise in doing away with the economic hardships placed on the Greek. Such trends in national exploitation have been prominent in the agendas of other right-wing parties within Greece as well.

The main cause of Euroscepticism within Greece stems from the consequences of the Financial crisis as discussed above as well as reinvigorating a lost sense of national pride, aimed at limiting the power of the EU institutions and preventing the transfer of power from national agencies to the European ones. Many citizens look at the EU, the same way Latin America would look at the IMF. According to recent surveys by Eurobarometer, 43% of Greeks positively view the EU while 19% view the EU negatively. This goes in contrast with the averages wherein 45% view the EU positively while 16% view it negatively.[26] The far-right has therefore put forth alternatives to resolve this issue by proposing self-sufficiency and historical revisionism.

 Conclusion

Since the far-right has been divided amongst its approaches in tackling various issues, they may not have been able to considerably impact the policy choices of the EU. However, with the rising influence of the far right signified by the recent EU Parliamentary elections and the rise of the right wing within the local general body elections of its respective countries, it would be imperative to understand the preceding themes exploited by them regardless of the approaches employed in addressing themes. European society has now considerably evolved from an economic-oriented stance to an identity-based narrative, with a considerable shift towards cultural issues. Amongst the four themes analysed, immigration has become a considerable focal point within the contemporary narratives which occupy a broad theme of national insecurity wrought by concerns over unemployment, climate change, instances of terrorism, etc. Furthermore, the far-right parties considerably benefit from social media as a platform to keep these themes within the greater political discourse. This has been done without any apparent contextualisation, therefore generating the likelihood of spreading predominantly reproduced disinformation.

In conclusion, the rise of the far-right in Europe is indicative of a broader realignment in political allegiances and priorities. While these parties capitalize on national grievances and a rejection of elite governance, they also reflect the complexities of contemporary issues, including mass migration and energy transitions. The potential for collaboration among various rightist factions, despite ideological differences, suggests a significant transformation in the legislative landscape. As the future of European politics unfolds, the response from mainstream parties will be crucial in determining the extent to which the far-right can consolidate its power and influence policy direction across the continent.

This article is a contribution to our Elections Newsletter, an analytical and research-based newsletter giving a rundown of the 2024 global elections.

References

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[12]Dutkiewicz, J. (2024, May 2). How rioting farmers unraveled Europe’s ambitious climate plan. Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/24146466/europe-farmer-protests-eu-climate-environmental-policy-subsidies-livestock

[13] Schultheis, E. (2023, April 25). Austria’s Far-Right Freedom Party Gains Advantage Ahead of Elections. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/25/austria-far-right-politics-elections-freedom-party/#:~:text=Shortly%20after%20his%20populist%20far-right%20Freedom%20Party%20made%20gains%20in

[14] Welle, D. (2024, June 9). EU elections: Far-right makes gains in Germany, France. dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/eu-elections-far-right-makes-gains-in-germany-france/live-69312194#liveblog-post-69317418

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[20] Klacar, B. (2020, August 5). Serbia’s right-wing shift risks fuelling extremism. Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/08/04/serbias-right-wing-shift-risks-fuelling-extremism/

[21]Kingdom of Netherlands. (n.d.). Serbia: European, but not in the EU yet. The Netherlands and Serbia. https://www.netherlandsandyou.nl/web/serbia/about-us/meet-the-ambassador#:~:text=This%20partly%20reflects%20lack%20of,the%20population%20support%20EU%20membership.

[22] Dajč, H., Radonjić, O., Radulović, M., Samardžić, N., & Vasiljević , M. (2022). Russian (hidden and overt) economic, political and cultural influences in Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Montenegro. European Union.

[23] Cohen, L. J. (2001). Post-Milosevic Serbia. Current History, 100(644), 99–108. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45318583

[24] S.A, T. P. (2024, May 13). Survey finds majority of Poles, Europeans concerned with migration. Telewizja Polska S.A. https://tvpworld.com/77502535/survey-finds-poles-fellow-europeans-increasingly-concerned-with-migration

[25] Union, E. (2020). (rep.). The OLAF Report 2020. Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. Retrieved from https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-12/olaf_report_2020_en.pdf.

[26] Bureau, A. (2023). Survey: 7 out of 10 Greeks believe that the country benefited from joining the EU – Greek City Times. Creek City Times. https://greekcitytimes.com/2023/12/06/survey-7-out-of-10-greeks-eu/

The views expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not reflect the views or opinions of Diplomania or its members.