Beyond the Himalayas: The Tibet Issue in Sino-Indian Relations and National Security

By: Diva Kedia

The author is a first-year student at the Jindal School of International Affairs. She can be reached at 24jsia-dkedia@jgu.edu.in. 

Source: Peter M., Free Tibet Protest at San Francisco Consulate, March 17th, 2008.

Introduction 

Tibet is an important issue in India-China relations. India and China began to share the now-disputed common border after China occupied Tibet in 1950. Tibet possesses a lengthy and profound history as a nation coexisting with China among the shifting political power dynamics among empires and kingdoms in Asia. In 1913, the 13th Dalai Lama had proclaimed Tibet's independence, and the nation retained its own flag, money, stamps, passports, and military forces. In the aftermath of the Communist upheaval in 1948, China invaded Tibet in 1950. Tibet, overwhelmed, was compelled to give away its independence.

In India, the "Tibetan question" has persisted due to the Dalai Lama's presence and the sizeable Tibetan refugee population residing across the country. Considering the events that have shaped relations between India and China post 1947, India's concerns have been heightened in recent years by China's infrastructure and military expansion in Tibet, as well as reports of intentions to dam or redirect rivers that originate in Tibet and flow into India. India's open democratic system and longstanding practice of providing asylum for displaced peoples make it politically impossible for the country to accept China's demands on the Tibet issue. The military squabbles during the COVID-19 pandemic justify India raising such concerns.

Historical Background 

Tibet acts as a buffer state between China and India because of its geographic location. It is of strategic importance for both countries. It is a vast physical expanse lying across the mighty Himalayas, stretching from Kashmir in the west to Arunachal Pradesh and beyond in the east. India attempted to convince China to acknowledge Tibet's claim to independence after China took control of the region in 1950, amidst strong opposition from the Tibetan population. In 1959, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, sought and received political asylum in India. China accused the Indian government of permitting anti-China operations to take place inside the country. The Tibetan Plateau is the major source of rivers that flow into India, China and other Southeast Asian countries. Control over this region would give China significant leverage over these vital water resources. Maintaining stability in Tibet is crucial for China to ensure uninterrupted access to these resources. The Himalayas form a natural barrier, but also a potential point of conflict. China's concern was that a destabilized Tibet could create opportunities for external powers to interfere. The Indian government’s decision to provide refuge to the Dalai Lama during the 1959 Tibetan uprising heightened Chinese animosity. The forward policy pushed by then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in early 1961 to effectively eradicate Chinese adversaries through non-violence also proved to be detrimental. Further, the war between India and China in 1962 resulted in significant deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries. The 1962 conflict resulted in unresolved territorial disputes and deep mutual distrust, tainting India-China relations. China's partnership with Pakistan and geopolitical alliances during the Cold War further heightened tensions, and ongoing border conflicts and lingering hostility continue to fuel the deteriorating relationship.

Security Challenges and Military Dimensions 

In recent years, China has substantially boosted its military presence in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). China’s soldier deployment and infrastructure improvements span across the region, hence presenting a direct challenge to India's security along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This comprises the increase in the deployment of thousands of freshly enlisted soldiers and officers from Mainland China to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Western Theatre Command (WTC) as part of the 2024 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Spring recruitment initiative.  

China has advanced military infrastructure projects, including 417 Key Roadways Projects for a logistical network that utilises three-dimensional transportation networks (TAR) comprising airports, railways, and roads China's assertiveness has been viewed as a reaction to India's mobilisation of 10,000 troops in 2024 and the enhancement of strategic infrastructure, particularly the Sela Tunnel, in the border regions adjacent to the LAC. Beijing's renaming of 62 locations of sovereign Indian territory as part of "South-Tibet" is a component of the "Three Warfares" tactic aimed at systematically shaping both domestic and global perceptions of their extraterritorial assertions. 

The construction of infrastructure in TAR's border regions comprises residential settlements and Xiaokang villages (an aspect of the CCP’s overall strategy of transforming China into a moderately prosperous society). Infrastructure development in Tibet and the establishment of a new Border Construction and Development Department by the Chinese government are not shunned by India. Expanding logistics and infrastructure, enhancing border security and developing commercial routes to project force or influence against India are the three primary strategic goals carried out by the new Border department. However, India is worried about the strategic impact of such activity. Specifically, the operations and projects of this border department along the critical borders endanger India's regional security in the face of deteriorating relations.  

According to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Land Boundary Law, which was implemented in the wake of the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes, the PLA's military infrastructure development and buildup against India will be accelerated by this new local border agency. When the two countries met in July 2024 during an ASEAN forum in Laos, they emphasised the need of resolving border concerns. But through China’s constant border initiatives—which include institutional changes that strengthen militarisation attempts, dual-purpose residential areas, widespread mapping and surveying, drone development, the establishment of additional barracks and their improvement, etc. it continues to severely jeopardise India's domestic security and sovereignty.

The Middle Way Approach to Resolve the Tibet Issue 

His Holiness the Dalai Lama proposed the Middle Way Approach to resolve the Tibet issue and bring stability and peace amongst the Chinese and Tibetan people. The present circumstance of Tibet under the Chinese government is unacceptable to the Tibetan populace. The strategy and methods to attain true autonomy for all Tibetans residing in the three traditional provinces of Tibet that lie within the regulations of the PRC are found by taking a middle route between the demands of the both of them.

Tibet was historically an autonomous nation and had the legal right to autonomy. Nonetheless, China persists in asserting its sovereignty over Tibet and governs it with strict authority, infringing upon the fundamental rights of the Tibetan populace. The Middle Way Approach (Umaylam in Tibetan) represents a compromise between conflicting perspectives. According to the Middle Way, Tibet would continue to be a constituent of China, yet Tibetans would possess substantial autonomy. China does not accept this as it perceives the Middle Way as a guise for Tibetan independence and a threat to China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

This method aligns with China's constitution, which permits autonomy in regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, and has received endorsement from the US government. Under the implementation of the Middle Way, China would govern Tibet's defence and foreign relations, while the Tibetan populace would administer their own internal matters, encompassing religion, culture, education, economy, and ecology.

The Middle Way Policy aims to ensure social and political assurances. If Independence were reinstated according to Tibet's current geography, it would encompass just the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which has quite a small population. This policy guarantees enhanced short- and long-term advantages to secure authentic autonomy for all of Tibet, rather than independence for only a portion of it. However, since the inception of the Middle Way Policy, there has been minimal progress in the situation within Tibet. Multiple rounds of talk with the Chinese since 2002, following a nine-year hiatus, has yielded no significant results. The Dalai Lama has been repeatedly accused by China of being a 'splittist' and for going after 'Independence in guise', regardless of the Dalai Lama having gave up his political powers in its entirety.

This approach, even if accepted by China, would still pose a sizeable threat to India as the defence sector and foreign relations of Tibet would be under the control of the Chinese government and this could still be used to undermine India’s sovereignty and security. 

Conclusion 

The Tibet question is paramount to the Sino-Indian rivalry. Resolving this issue requires careful diplomacy, mutual concessions, and commitment to addressing the concerns of all.  The Tibet issue is complex and sensitive and is likely to continue to be a source of tension between India and China for years to come. However, it is important for both countries to find ways to manage their differences peacefully and to work towards a resolution that is acceptable to all parties. For India, maintaining a balance between supporting Tibetan autonomy, safeguarding its sovereignty, and managing its relationship with China is a delicate and ongoing challenge. The path forward must prioritize dialogue and practical solutions while upholding the principles of peace, security, and respect for territorial integrity. 

References:

History of Tibet - Free Tibet. (n.d.). Free Tibet. https://freetibet.org/freedom-for-tibet/history-of-tibet/ 

 Sikri, R. (2011). THE TIBET FACTOR IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS. Journal of International Affairs, 64(2), 55–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385534 

 Pokharna, B. (2009). THE TIBET FACTOR AND INDIA - CHINA RELATIONS. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 70(2), 611–626. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42743919  

Uppal, S., & National Council of Educational Research and Training. (2007). INDIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS. In POLITICS IN INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: Textbook in political science for class XII (2024 ed., pp. 58-63). NCERT. https://ncert.nic.in/textbook.php?leps2=4-9 

Albert, Eleanor. “Water Clouds on the Tibetan Plateau.” Council on Foreign Relations, 9 May 2016. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/water-clouds-tibetan-plateau

Thomas, N. (n.d.). Unresolved Boundaries: The 1962 India-China Conflict and Its Ongoing Impact. National Legislators’ Conference Bharat (NLC Bharat). https://nlcbharat.org/unresolved-boundaries-the-1962-india-china-conflict-and-its-ongoing-impact/ 

Khalid, Masood. (2021, November 30). Pakistan-China relations in a changing geopolitical environment – NUS Institute of South Asian studies (ISAS). https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistan-china-relations-in-a-changing-geopolitical-environment/ 

Taipodia, C. (2024, March 11). Sela Tunnel opening a huge milestone in India's security. The Borderlens. https://www.borderlens.com/2024/03/11/sela-tunnel-opening-a-huge-milestone-in-indias-security/ 

Kathju, J., & Kathju, J. (2024, June 21). In message to China, India to rename 30 places in Tibet as bilateral ties hit new snag. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3267589/message-china-india-rename-30-places-tibet-bilateral-ties-hit-new-snag 

Younten, T. (2024, April 16). China's latest Military Buildup in Tibet: China’s Provocation does not end with just Cartographic. Indian Defence Review. https://indiandefencereview.com/chinas-latest-military-buildup-in-tibet-chinas-provocation-does-not-end-with-just-cartographic-aggression/  

Shekhawat, S. (2022, January 9). CHINA’S XIAOKANG VILLAGES. Organisation for Research on China and Asia. https://orcasia.org/article/233/chinas-xiaokang-villages 

Younten, T. (2024, August 8). China’s New Border Department in Tibet accelerates infrastructure buildup near India: Deciphering its strategic goals and implications. Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). https://www.claws.in/chinas-new-border-department-in-tibet-accelerates-infrastructure-buildup-near-india-deciphering-its-strategic-goals-and-implications/ 

His Holiness’s Middle Way Approach For Resolving the Issue of Tibet. (n.d.). The Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama | The 14th Dalai Lama. https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/middle-way-approach  

THE MIDDLE WAY. (n.d.). International Campaign for Tibet. https://savetibet.org/why-tibet/the-middle-way/  

 Parikh, R. (2018). Tibet’s Way Forward – Marching Down the Middle Path. The Bastion. https://thebastion.co.in/ideas/tibets-way-forward-marching-the-middle-path/ 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s). They do not reflect the views or opinions of Diplomania or its members.