Book Review
By: Amisha Singh
Amisha is a final year LLB (Hons.) student at the Jindal Global Law School. She can be reached at amishasingh2001@gmail.com
Theorists and academics in security studies have conventionally analysed the precursors and outcomes of violent and non-violent movements separately, refraining from systematically comparing the two. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan undertake this comparison by addressing the fundamental question of the effectiveness of civil resistance movements in contrast to their violent counterparts. Furthermore, they assess why certain civil resistance campaigns fail and certain violent movements succeed. The book aims at testing empirically, the hypotheses and assertions about ‘Non-Violent Action’, missing in the works of renowned scholars like Gene Sharp[i] and Robert Helvey, who have produced “theoretical gold mines” on Civil Resistance (Chenoweth & Sharp, 2013, pp.21). 'Why Civil Resistance Works' is not only seminal in the field of security studies but peace studies too by advancing empirically and theoretically rich arguments in favour of civil resistance that can be employed by social activists and institutions (governmental and non-governmental) in propagating change.
A scholar of political violence and its alternatives, Erica Chenoweth is the Frank Staton Professor of the First Amendment and a Susan S. and Kenneth L. Wallach Professor at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard University[ii]. They head the Nonviolent Action Lab at Harvard[iii] and recently published their book 'Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to know', a sequel to Why Civil Resistance Works which they co-authored with Maria J Stephan. An advisor to Freedom House and Humanity United, Maria is the Co-Lead and Chief Organizer for the Horizons Project and aims at bridging the inter-sectoral gap when exploring the role, outcomes and related effects of civil resistance and non-violent movements.[iv] In 2008, the authors published a joint article in the journal International Security on the success of nonviolent campaigns in comparison to armed movements. Given the widespread interest their article generated, the authors went on to publish a comprehensive study that elaborated upon the initial arguments by supplementing the quantitatively rich research with pertinent case studies and related qualitative analysis.
The nine chapters of the book are organised in three parts, in addition to a copious appendix and notes. The first part, which includes three chapters, focuses on how high participation levels and diversity of participants and their consequences, improve the success rate of resistance movements. After undertaking a thorough literature review, they systematically chart out the necessary ingredients for successful civil resistance campaigns, i.e. security force defections and high participation. Additionally, they pre-empt and respond to possible critiques of their arguments in chapter three. The second part covers four case studies, analysed to assess why certain nonviolent movements succeed and others do not[v]. The case studies include the successful Iranian Revolution, the partial success of the First Palestinian Intifada, the success of the Philippine People Power Movement and the failed Burmese Uprising. The final section investigates the outcomes and implications of civil resistance and highlights the high probability of such movements resulting in democratic setups and the low possibility of violence post-resistance. The conclusion summarises the fundamental arguments and their salience for policy, which indicates how institutions can become better equipped to aid civil resistance campaigns through diplomatic support, sanctions and related measures. All chapters have been supplemented with an introduction and conclusion, to assist the reader in seeking clarity of the ideas presented therein.
Methodologically, their work stands out for its laborious research and review of existing literature, as well as, the quantitative analysis of “323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.6) from their Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset. The study employs large-N quantitative methods to juxtapose the role of nonviolent and violent movements in bringing about socio-political change. In addition to the rich quantitative analysis that involves regression tables, graphs, charts and data analysis, the study also uses qualitative methods that include the case-study method and interviews, used in conducting ‘statistical and congruence testing’[vi]. The case studies not only portray the varied vignettes of the revolutionary transition[vii] movements (violent and nonviolent), involving “regime change, secession or liberation from foreign occupation” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.10) but also act as evidence to corroborate the theoretical claims posited by the authors.
The central arguments advanced by the authors, about why civil resistance campaigns have historically been effective, are two-fold. First, the lower levels of the “physical[viii], moral[ix], commitment and informational barriers[x]” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.220) in nonviolent movements allow for higher levels of participation; and secondly, this “can activate numerous mechanisms that improve the odds of success” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.30). Diversity among campaign participants fosters “tactical diversity, which makes outmanoeuvring the opponent and increasing pressure points more plausible” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.40). These mechanisms aim at the systematic demolition of the adversary’s ‘pillars of strength’ through non-violent coercion, loyalty shifts amongst those working in dominant institutions, international sanctions cum external support[xi], tactical diversity and innovation, resilience and what the authors call “backfiring”. When regimes adopt repressive measures to crack down on peaceful nonviolent protests and campaigns, the public perception of the adversary usually becomes negative, thereby fostering loyalty shifts and increased involvement of the passive supporters of movements. The authors note that the most successful nonviolent resistance campaigns have been those that have ensured security force defections, alongside high participation.[xii] Chenoweth & Stephan (2013) also observe that regime changes that take place through nonviolence are likely to be more stable and democratic than those which arise from violent struggles (pp.201-202).
The evidence cited by Chenoweth and Stephan in favour of their arguments is both quantitative (statistical findings from the NAVCO dataset) and qualitative (case studies of Iran, the Palestinian Territories, the Philippines and Burma). The statistical findings suggest that nonviolent campaigns have an approximately 55% success rate, 25% chance of partial success and 20% chance of failure in comparison to a 25% success rate, 15% chance of partial success and 60% chance of failure among violent campaigns[xiii], which is suggestive of the relative efficacy of nonviolent movements. Among all the four case studies, the authors found the violent campaigns to be a complete failure in contrast to the nonviolent campaigns, which had different results in each case[xiv]. The successful Iranian Revolution is an interesting case study that stands as an outlier to Chenoweth & Stephan’s argument that regimes that emerge out of civil resistance lead to lower or negligible violence after the completion of the campaign. The revolution saw high participation because of the lower “physical, moral, informational and commitment barriers” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.112), it usefully produced security shifts, had clear tactical diversity and was able to use the regime repression as a way to garner further support. However, as noted by the authors, the correlation between repression and mobilization is complicated since regime repression reduced protest activity in Iran in the short run but fostered larger mobilization in the long run.[xv] Upon the successful overthrow of the repressive regime, the new regime faced violence a year after the campaign ended. The authors suggest that the “ideology of a resistance campaign can shape the political and social milieu after victory” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.117) and the presence of radical Islamic clerics in the post-transition regime of Iran led to its downfall. The failed Burmese uprising is suggestive of how important the ingredients of successful civil resistance campaigns are; their inability to maintain unified popular support and produce loyalty shifts was pivotal in the failure of the uprising (violent and non-violent). Chenoweth & Stephan (2013) note “Statistical tests and congruence testing through four case studies support the notion that nonviolent campaigns are superior at inflicting considerable costs on the adversary in ways that divide the regime from its critical pillars of support” (pp.221-222).
Why Civil Resistance Works is an impressive piece of scholarship, written in an intelligible and straightforward manner with systematically structured chapters that enunciate the authors’ ideas. The chapters bear a logical flow and their sub-sections facilitate the reader’s comprehension of the various facets of civil resistance movements: what makes them effective; the contrast to their violent counterparts; and the shortfalls, if any. Throughout the book, the authors aim to demolish the myths surrounding civil resistance campaigns in addition to responding to possible criticisms of their argument.[xvi] An otherwise promising book with a wide target audience, the authors fail to make the book entirely intelligible to readers given their innate reliance on data work, which for non-specialists may be hard to comprehend. Despite ensuring that their claims are backed by evidence, they also fail to explain the role of political ideology in resistance campaigns, which they otherwise argue is crucial in determining the political and social circumstances post-transition[xvii]. However, the authors are forthcoming in accepting the shortfalls of their research.
The painstakingly compiled, thought-provoking account is a welcome addition to the corpus of knowledge on nonviolent action, especially given the scarcity of empirical accounts explicitly studying such movements comparing “violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013). Their pointers for further research, especially the conditions under which violent insurgencies lead to democratic regimes, have great scope to contribute to security studies. This book is not only academically salient but holds great significance in practice too, since it pins down the ingredients and precursors of successful civil resistance campaigns, essentially making it a handbook for activists and institutions alike.
References
[i] Gene Sharp’s book The Politics of Nonviolent Action “established the theoretical foundation for non-violent action” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.21) and has been widely studied as a handbook on civil or non-violent resistance.
[iii] It is an innovation hub that provides empirical evidence in support of movement-led political transformation.
[v] The authors briefly compare violent and nonviolent events in each case-study to assess how effective each type of resistance is in bringing about change.
[vi] (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.221)
[vii] As noted by the authors in the chapter on the implications of civil resistance, Terry Lynn Carl identifies four “modes of transition that include pacted, imposed, reformist and revolutionary” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.204). They go on to note that their focus lies in revolutionary modes of transition, wherein campaigns aim at regime change.
[viii] Physical barriers in nonviolent campaigns are usually lower than their violent counterparts given the plethora of tactics and activities available to activists, which include both high risk and low-risk methods. Another pertinent point raised by the authors is that nonviolent campaigns allow for female, youth and elderly participation, which is relatively lesser in violent movements given the physical prohibitions. (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.34)
[ix] Nonviolent resistance allows for higher mobilization and participation without placing “moral barriers” about killing and taking up weapons, which is often the case with violent campaigns. (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.37)
[x] As noted by the authors, engagement with resistance campaigns is correlated to the number of people who are expected to take part in a movement (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.35). Therefore, dissemination of information plays a crucial role in increasing participation which can be done very easily in nonviolent campaigns in contrast to violent ones, which require secrecy and controlled dissemination.
[xi] Through their analysis, the authors found that these things had neither a positive nor negative impact on the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns, but at the same time caution that international support is often a ‘double-edged sword’ that needs to be kept in check to maintain local primacy in campaigns, which is crucial for success. (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.225).
[xii] (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.58)
[xiii]Source: Figure 1.5, page 9 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013).
[xiv] Source: Table II. A: Case Selection, page 201 (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013).
[xv](Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.113)
[xvi] In chapter three, the authors, respond to two critiques: “Structural conditions dictate the outcomes of campaigns irrespective of the type of resistance and that the relationship between civil resistance and success is endogenous” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.62). Their response to the first critique is that civil resistance is often successful despite the environmental conditions in which the resistance arises, this is backed by qualitative and quantitative evidence. Concerning the second critique, they note that the evidence does not suggest endogeneity as such but the topic requires further research.
[xvii] (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013, pp.117).
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