By: Kalyani Janakiraman and Abhinav Patole
The authors are first-year master's and third-year bachelor's students respectively, at the Jindal School of International Affairs. They can be reached at 24jsia-krjanakiraman@jgu.edu.in and 22jsia-agpatole@jgu.edu.in.
Image Source: USA Today
Introduction
On the 1st of October 2024, the Israeli Iron Dome was greeted by a barrage of around 200 ballistic missiles. The Islamic Republic of Iran launched these missiles. Following the attacks, Israel has vowed to retaliate against Iran, with speculations that the Jewish state would target Iran’s oil facilities. The IDF also started a ground operation in southern Lebanon as a response to the missiles but was pushed back by soldiers from Hezbollah. In the midst of all of this, American President Joe Biden has reaffirmed his support for the State of Israel and described the Iranian operation as “defeated and ineffective.” The official casualty count for the attack stands currently at two.
The reason cited for this retaliation was the Israeli assassinations of several Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, including Hassan Nasrullah, a founding member of Hezbollah. This attack marks only the second time that Iran has retaliated against Israel from its territory, with the first instance being in April 2024, following Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Syria. The most recent Iranian barrage differs from the one in April due to the technological advancement in the missiles launched as retaliation. Speculations around the model of the missiles and study of the debris found point to using the Fattah-2 hypersonic missile, which can execute complex manoeuvres while on its way to the target, allowing it to skirt anti-missile defences efficiently. It also is one of the most precise ballistic missiles with an error circle of merely 20 metres.
A question which arises is why would Iran retaliating from its territories be significant, and why would the death of a Lebanese leader concern it? While Iran may not have had several direct skirmishes with Israel, it is important to note that Iran has been funding the operations of several militant outfits in and around the Israeli theatre. Hezbollah and Hamas stand out as chief among them. Iran uses these outfits as its proxies to keep a check on Israel. Most of the operations conducted by these militants can be interpreted as direct orders from Iran, and barring recent events, Iran has never had to directly intervene in matters regarding Israel, as the Iranian proxies have historically been able to handle an Israeli offensive with help from the funding provided by Iran. A direct involvement of the Islamic Republic in the conflict signals an intense escalation in the conflict.
The Shift from Proxy Wars to Direct Conflict
Since the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, with the ascension of Khomeini, Iran and Israel have been at a crossroads with one another. Iran refused to recognize Israel as a sovereign state, going so far as to declare the state of Israel ‘Little Satan’. The Iran-Israel relations soured further in 1982, when Iran emerged in support of Lebanon during the 1982 Lebanon war, supporting the Palestinian militants and Lebanese Shias during the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. It marked the start of a proxy war that has extended itself into the 21st century, and culminated with the Iranian attack on April this year. This attack marked the end of proxy wars, threatening the delicate balance of West Asia.
Iran’s direct attack on Israel marks a significant shift from its long-standing reliance on proxy warfare, primarily driven by the escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict and the broader geopolitical environment. According to The Guardian (2024), Iran’s missile strikes came in retaliation for Israel’s expanding military operations in Gaza and Lebanon, particularly following the October 2023 Hamas attack that killed 1,200 Israelis. Israel took the war to the ‘axis of resistance’ (Johny, 2024) on April 1st, 2024, by bombing the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing Brig. Gen. Reza Zahedi and others. Iran’s decision to launch direct missile attacks, including the use of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, reflects the willingness Iran showcases to redraw the red lines that kept the two countries reliant on proxy wars.
This attack on the embassy, paired with the killing of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, provoked a direct military response from Tehran. This escalation is a broader strategy to defend its regional interests and assert itself on the global stage. Domestically, under the leadership of both President Pezeshkian actively supporting military responses alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while also balancing internal calls for stability and economic relief amidst sanctions.
Economics of Attack
In August 2023, Iran's oil exports surged from 1.4 to 2 million barrels per day, the highest since the 2018 sanctions. This increase in illicit revenue reduces Tehran's incentive for diplomatic concessions, while hostage diplomacy provides access to frozen oil funds under humanitarian pretences. Russia has provided critical support to Iran's economy by reinforcing its defences and supplying advanced weapons, while also acting as a key partner in helping Iran evade Western sanctions through the exchange of oil for military resources.
Iran has managed to localise much of its missile production, particularly ballistic and cruise missiles, allowing it to reduce costs and rely less on international suppliers. While reliance on the CRINK (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) axis exists, Iran's focus on domestic production has allowed it to navigate around the sanctions. Domestically produced missiles such as Sejil and Kheibar, offer Tehran a cheaper and effective means of deterrence. The report states that years of reverse-engineering missiles have enabled Iran to enhance missile range by extending airframes and using lighter composite material. Iran's missile program represents a calculated economic decision to pursue cost-effective deterrence and influence through domestic innovation.
Analysis of the ongoing conflict
This Iranian operation and the imminent Israeli retaliation places the world in an extremely precarious position. For a country which had not directly attacked Israel throughout its entire existence to do so twice in 6 months points to a concerning change in the conduct of the two countries on the world stage. Further escalation of this conflict, would exacerbate all geopolitical tensions simmering the Europe and the Middle East with the Russian and Gazan theatres acting as the two centres, causing Washington to attempt an intervention to protect its interests in the region, but one cannot feel too safe after a study of the past ‘interventions’ USA has attempted in the Middle East.
While some argue that treating this conflict as a precursor to a Third World War is excessive, the reality remains unsettling: three out of four members of the CRINK axis are nuclear-armed, with murmurs of Iran not being that far behind, and all four revisionist states exhibit a willingness to resort to violence. They share a growing belief that their moment is approaching, anticipating a moment where the West falters. This confluence of factors leaves one with the understanding that one can never predict what could act as a catalyst to lead the world back into the darkest of times
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author (s). They do not reflect the views or opinions of Diplomania or its members.
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